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	Cognitive Load, Trigger Salience, and the Facilitation of Triggered Displaced Aggression
	Imagine the following scenario: a man named Tom is angered by a police officer who has issued him a citation for speeding and made derogatory comments about his driving. Tom drives away feeling angered by the incident. Suddenly, another car cuts into Tom’s lane, just ahead of him. Tom perceives the other person’s driving as erratic and irresponsible. Consequently, although normally a calm and patient driver, Tom honks wildly and yells obscenities at the other driver.
The previous scenario illustrates the concept of triggered displaced aggression (TDA; Pedersen, Gonzales, & Miller, 2000), wherein a prior provocation primes an individual for retaliation, such that a subsequent minor instigation evokes high aggression levels toward an undeserving target. Researchers previously have shown that alcohol increases TDA, and have hypothesized that this effect results from impaired cognitive processing capacity (Denson, Aviles, Pollock, Earleywine, Vasquez, & Miller, 2007). To date, no published studies have tested this hypothesis directly, as through the manipulation of cognitive load. Thus, the goal of this study is to test the hypothesis that limited cognitive capacity, induced via cognitive load, and the salience of a provocation will interact to increase triggered displaced aggression. 
Triggered Displaced Aggression
Displaced aggress occurs whenever a person is provoked by someone but is unable or unwilling to retaliate, and subsequently aggresses against a new, undeserving target. Triggered displaced aggression, however, occurs when the target of the displaced aggression provides a second provocation, termed a trigger (Pedersen et al., 2000). Thus, the aggressor encounters two instigations—a Time 1 or initial provocation and a subsequent (Time 2) trigger. 
An interesting aspect of TDA is that the trigger can be mild, yet elicit high levels of aggression towards its source (see Pedersen et al., 2000; Vasquez, Denson, Pedersen, Stenstrom, & Miller, 2005).  On the basis of Berkowitz’s Neo-associationistic model (Berkowitz, 1990), researchers have hypothesized that this occurs because a provocation activates a network of aggression-related motives, cognitions, and emotions, which increase the readiness for aggressive responding. A provoked individual therefore becomes primed to interpret events in a more negative manner. As a result, the negative features of subsequent events are likely to be highly salient to provoked individuals relative to unprovoked individuals. Indeed, participants simply primed with aggressive constructs interpret ambiguous situations in a more aggressive manner than control participants (see Todorov & Bargh, 2002). Thus, because of their ambiguity, mild triggering events are susceptible to a biased attributional distortion as a result of prior provocation. The negative characteristics of the trigger appear more extreme, and this motivates higher levels of aggression (see Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003). Next, I discuss how cognitive load can impact both reactions to the triggering event and the ability to regulate and inhibit an aggressive response in the TDA paradigm.
Impaired Cognitive Processing Capacity
Situations that reduce cognitive processing capacity can affect how social events are perceived and interpreted (Forgas, 1995; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989), often leading to more rigid, less flexible responses to social targets (Chun & Kruglansky, 2006; Garcia-Marques, Hamilton, & Maddox, 2002; Lieberman, Jarcho, & Obatashi, 2005; Mikulincer, Dolev, & Shaver, 2004; Molden, Plaks, & Dweck, 2006; Sherman & Frost, 2000). Reliance on categorical information such as stereotypes, for example, often increases under cognitive load, presumably because use of counter-stereotypical information requires more cognitive resources (Devine, 1989; Gilbert & Hixon 1991; Pendry & Macrae, 1999; Wegener, Clark, & Petty, 2006). Thus, unless strongly motivated to engage in careful, deeper processing (e.g., Chun & Kruglanski, 2006; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), individuals experiencing reduced cognitive capacity will rely on processes that demand fewer resources and require less effort. 
It follows, then, that individuals under cognitive load are also more likely to attend to and rely on highly salient information. The more salient a stimulus or cue, the more attention it attracts and the greater the probability that it will be processed and impact subsequent behavior. For instance, Trope and Gaunt (2000) showed that cognitive load exacerbates the fundamental attribution error unless situational information is salient. In other words, when situational variables were highly salient, reliance on them was more likely to occur, regardless of load condition (Trope & Gaunt, 2000). Thus, during a state of limited cognitive resources, it is the more salient cues that individuals are likely to process and that are likely to influence behavior.
Self-regulation, Cognitive Load, and Aggression
	How is impaired cognitive processing capacity likely to impact retaliatory behavior? What role does cue salience play in aggressive contexts while an individual is under cognitive load?  In the context of provoking interactions, limited cognitive processing capacity can impact retaliatory behavior in at least two ways. One involves self-regulatory processes that moderate behavior. The second involves the processing of instigating cues and, potentially, self-regulatory processes involved in perceptual and affective reactions to them. Self-regulation refers to the volitional adjustment of a behavioral response based on the perceived consequences of that behavior. Inhibition, which is one potential form of self-regulation, requires cognitive resources that are finite (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Kanfer & Karoly, 1972). Thus, the depletion of these resources during situations that call for self-regulation is likely to reduce an individuals’ ability to regulate his/her subsequent behavior (Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). Previous research indicates that self-regulation plays an important role in the inhibition of aggression. For example, Dewall, Baumeister, Stillman, and Gailliot (2007) found that participants who initially engaged in a task requiring self-regulation and were then provoked expressed more retaliatory aggression than did participants who were provoked but who had not first expended self-regulatory resources. 
To the extent that limiting cognitive resources interferes with self-regulation, inducing cognitive load could influence aggression in at least two ways during a TDA interaction. First, inducing cognitive load during the presentation of instigating cues is expected to influence aggression by enhancing the processing of salient information. Specifically, I hypothesize that when cognitive capacity is reduced, participants are more likely to process provocations that are high in salience compared to those that are low in salience (see Steele & Southwick, 1985). Cues that are low in salience are either not noticed or are not sufficiently elaborated on to reliably affect behavior. Similar arguments have been proposed by researchers studying effects of alcohol on aggression, who hypothesize that alcohol-induced impairment of cognitive capacity results in enhanced processing of salient events and cues, such as provocations, relative to less salient inhibitory cues (Ito, Miller & Pollock, 1996; Permanen, 1976; Taylor & Chermack, 1993). Furthermore, under cognitive load cues and cognitions that normally serve to appraise events appropriately (e.g. the trigger is only a minor annoyance) as well as those that serve to inhibit negative affective reactions (e.g., empathy, norms against extreme anger) likely are not processed sufficiently. Thus, the trigger appears as a more extreme provocation and produces more intense negative affect, which, in turn, motivates more aggression (cf., Berkowitz, 1993).  Thus, negative affect is expected to mediate the relationship between the IVs and aggression.
Cognitive load also could moderate aggression if it is induced while retaliatory decisions are being made. Specifically, inducing cognitive load while an individual aggresses is expected to augment aggression because cognitive load should interfere with the processing of inhibitory cues and cognitions. Thus, I expect that reducing cognitive processing capacity at that very moment that an individual engages in retaliatory behavior will increase displaced aggression.
In summary, cognitive load could augment aggressive behavior when it is induced during a provocation, during the act of aggressing, or both. These are possibilities that the TDA paradigm is uniquely well-suited to investigate. Although each process is predicted to have a unique effect they may also interact to produce a multiplicative effect on TDA. In studies investigating the effects of alcohol on aggression, for instance, participants typically are under the influence of the drug both during the provocation and while they aggress (see Denson et al., 2007). One cannot separate the effects of impaired cognitive processing capacity during a provoking incident from those during the act of aggression. Cognitive load, however, can be induced at any point in the TDA paradigm in order to assess its effects during the trigger, during aggression, or both. Disentangling these effects is an additional goal of the current study.
The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that cognitive resources during a triggering event and the salience of that event would interact to moderate TDA. Under no cognitive load, no difference in aggression between low and high salience trigger conditions was predicted because participants were expected to have sufficient cognitive resources to process both a high and low salience trigger. Inducing cognitive load during the trigger, however, was predicted to reduce processing capacity such that high salience triggers would become the focus of attention, producing more negative affect and higher levels of aggression. In contrast, a low-salience trigger is less likely to be processed because doing so requires more cognitive resources. In consequence, negative affect and aggression levels in this condition were expected to be lower than in the high salience condition.
With regards to the cognitive load manipulation at aggression, it was predicted that inducing load as participants retaliated would increase aggression. In addition, the effects of cognitive load were expected to be additive, such that aggression was predicted to be enhanced among participants who experienced cognitive load both during trigger presentation and during retaliation. Moreover, these effects were predicted to interact with trigger salience, such that experiencing cognitive load at trigger presentation would be particularly likely to elicit high levels of aggression when the trigger was highly salient, compared to when it was less salient.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 80 undergraduates (66 females; mean age = 19.15 years) from the University of Southern California participated in the study for course credit. The conditions of the study constituted a 2 (Trigger salience: high/low) x 2 (Load at trigger: yes/no) x 2 (Load at aggression: yes/no) between-subjects factorial design with constant Time 1 provocation and constant trigger. 
Procedure
	Each participant was seated individually in a separate room and was told that the purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between mental performance, impression formation, and decision-making. The participant was led to believe that he/she would interact with a second participant who was in a different room as part of the impression formation and decision-making aspects of the experiment. This bogus participant subsequently became the target of aggression.
Provocation Induction
The participant first engaged in a bogus mental task, which served as the basis for the initial provocation induction. He/she was given 4 min to rearrange a set of 15 scrambled letters into words (i.e. anagrams). After 4 min, the experimenter collected the task sheet with the answers and went to another room, ostensibly to score the participant’s performance. After approximately 3 min, he returned to give the participant feedback about her work on the task. The participant was told that she had done a poor job by not finishing all the anagrams. He went on to say that normally she would have to redo all 15 anagrams, but that, frankly, he did not want to be wasting his time. The feedback was given in a derogatory manner, with both an annoyed tone of voice and an annoyed facial expression. This provocation induction has been employed successfully in previous TDA experiments to induce negative affect (e.g., Vasquez et al., 2005). 
Trigger Induction
Following the provocation, the participant engaged in a second bogus task that was the basis for the trigger induction, which consisted of a slightly negative evaluation of her performance on that task. More specifically, she was asked to list six personality characteristics that would be helpful for a space station crew member to possess (the “NASA task”). The participant was told that she would exchange solutions with the other participant in order to evaluate each other’s work on the NASA task.
After the participant completed the task, the experimenter ostensibly took her responses to the other participant for evaluation and gave the actual participant the work ostensibly completed by the bogus participant. The participant was asked to inspect the other person’s work and evaluate it on the following three dimensions: 1) the quality of the answers; 2) the degree to which the answers made sense; 3) the individual’s overall performance on the task. In addition, the participant was asked to rate the task itself on three dimensions: 1) how challenging it was; 2) how important it was; 3) how interesting it was. The scale used to rate the performance ranged from 1 (no good at all) to 7 (extremely good).
 After the participant finished the evaluating the other person’s responses, the experimenter gave her the bogus evaluation of her own work, which constituted the trigger induction. For those in the cognitive load at trigger condition, load was induced at this point (see below). The participant was given the cognitive load instructions and was asked to rehearse the number in her head and read the evaluations of her work. Performance on each of the dimensions was rated 3 or 4, with an average overall rating of 3.3, just below the scale mid-point of 4.0. In addition, the bogus participant ostensibly wrote comments stating that the participant’s performance was not great and could have been better.
Trigger Salience Manipulation
	 In the high trigger salience condition, the evaluation of the participant’s work and the written comments about his performance were written in red ink, whereas the ratings for and comments about the task itself were written in black ink. In addition, the written comments about the task were written in a paragraph separate from the comments about the participant’s performance in order to create a stronger contrast between them. In the low trigger salience condition, the ratings for the task and the participant’s performance were all written in black ink and both types of comments were written in a single paragraph, thus reducing the contrast between them.
Cognitive Load
The following procedure has been used successfully in previous research to induce cognitive load (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Pendry & Macrae, 1999). Participants in the cognitive load conditions were asked to memorize a 10-digit number, ostensibly as part of a test of their memory skills and were asked to rehearse it as they engaged in the relevant task. Immediately after they had completed their evaluation of the bogus participant, participants in the cognitive load at trigger condition were given 30 seconds to read and memorize the number and were asked to continue to rehearse it as they read the evaluation of their work. They were told that it was important for them to continue to rehearse the number in their minds while they read the evaluation. They were then given two minutes to read the trigger. Two minutes later, the experimenter returned to the room and asked the participants to stop rehearsing the number. They were also asked if they had had enough time to read the evaluation. All participants indicated that they had read the entire evaluation of their work. 
Participants in the cognitive load at aggression condition received the cognitive load instruction just prior to completing the aggression measure (see below) and manipulation checks. These participants were also told that we wanted to assess their memory skills by having them read a 10-digit number for 30 seconds and rehearse it at the same time that they decided how long the other participant would be distracted (i.e. complete the aggression measure). They were explicitly asked to stop rehearsing as soon as they had aggressed against their target. Thus cognitive load was not induced while they completed the manipulation checks. In the cognitive load at trigger and aggression condition, the participants received the same instructions as those in the load at trigger condition and were asked to rehearse the number when again when they completed the aggression measure. They were explicitly asked to stop rehearsing the number as soon as they completed the aggression measure. As soon as the participants gave the experimenter the aggression measure, they were reminded to stop rehearsing the number. 
Participants in the no cognitive load condition did not memorize or rehearse any number. This created a design with the following four cognitive load conditions: 1) no load induction; 2) load induced only during the trigger induction; 3) load induced only during aggression; 4) cognitive load induced both during the trigger induction and during aggression.
Aggression
Following the trigger induction, the participant completed the aggression measure, which has been employed in previous TDA studies (see Pedersen, 2006; Vasquez et al., 2005). Participants were asked to decide how long the other participant should hold his/her hand in icy water, ostensibly as a distraction while performing another task. The participant was asked to immerse her hand in the ice water to show her how distracting the cold water was. The real purpose of this procedure was to ensure that the participant realized that placing one’s hand in the water was painful. Participants circled the amount of time that the other participant should be distracted on a 9-point scale starting at “1 = no distraction at all” which increased by 10 second intervals to “9 = 80 seconds/very strong distraction”. 
The participant then completed a packet containing the trigger salience and cognitive load manipulation checks and items assessing participants’ reactions to the trigger induction. Two items using a 9-point scale that ranged from 1(not at all) to 9 (extremely so) were employed to indicate 1) the degree to which the evaluation of participants’ work on the NASA task was clear, and 2) the degree to which participants were able to pay attention to the evaluation of their work on the NASA task. These two items were manipulation checks for the trigger salience and cognitive load manipulations respectively. Using a 7-point scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely so), participants were asked to recall the degree to which they experienced the following emotions as a result of reading the evaluations of their work: 1) happy; 2) annoyed; 3) complimented; 4) irritated; 5) angry; 6) offended. These items constituted the measure of participants’ reactions to the trigger. The participants were debriefed after completing the aggression and manipulation check packet. 
Results
Load and Salience Manipulation Checks
Planned comparisons among conditions on the 2 manipulation check items pertaining to trigger salience and cognitive load revealed no reliable differences (all p values > .10).
Reactions to trigger induction
A composite of the 6 items assessing participants’ reactions to the trigger (= .77) was tested using A 2 (Trigger salience: high/low) x 2 (Load at trigger: yes/no) x 2 (Load at aggression: yes/no) between subjects ANOVA. This analysis did not show the expected three-way interaction among the independent variables (F < 1).  However, the predicted salience x load at trigger interaction was reliable, F(1, 71) = 4.37, p < .05 (see Figure 1). The overall pattern suggests that cognitive load had no impact on the reactions to the trigger when the trigger was low in salience or when cognitive load was induced only during aggression, but that cognitive load produced more negative reactions to the trigger in the high trigger salience conditions when load was induced during the trigger and/or during aggression. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.  The cognitive load at trigger/high trigger salience condition was expected to produce more negative reactions to the trigger (M = 5.27, SD = .61), relative to those under no cognitive load/high trigger salience (M = 4.35, SD = 1.16), no load/low salience trigger (M = 4.58, SD = 1.06), and those in the cognitive load at trigger/low salience condition (M = 4.62, SD = .98). A planned contrast comparing the first condition to the other three confirmed that inducing load during the high salience trigger augmented negative reactions to it, t(37) = 2.23, p = .03. 
A second prediction was that the load at both trigger and aggression/high salience trigger condition would produce more negative reactions than either of the no load conditions, as well as the load at both trigger and aggression/low salience trigger conditions. A planned contrast comparing the first condition to the other three confirmed this prediction, t(34) = 2.10, p = .04.
Aggression
A 2 (Trigger salience: high/low) x 2 (Load at trigger: yes/no) x 2 (Load at aggression: yes/no) between subjects ANOVA on the aggression measure did not show the expected three-way interaction among the independent variables (F < 1).  There was a main effect of salience F(1, 72) = 7.88, p = .01, and a marginal main effect of cognitive load F(1, 72) = 3.70, p = .06. The more important and predicted salience x load at trigger interaction, however, was reliable, F(1, 72) = 8.71, p < .01. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. Paralleling the negative reactions to the trigger, the overall pattern of aggressive responding shows that cognitive load did not impact aggression when the trigger was low in salience or when cognitive load was induced only during aggression. Cognitive load did increase aggression in the high trigger salience condition when load was induced during the trigger and during both trigger and aggression (see Figure 2). 
To examine the hypothesis that the load at trigger/high trigger salience condition (M = 6.55, SD = 1.21) would produce more displaced aggression compared to the no cognitive load/high trigger salience (M = 4.22, SD = 1.09), no load/low trigger salience (M = 4.55, SD = 2.02), and load at trigger/low trigger salience conditions (M = 4.36, SD = 2.34), a planned contrast was used to compare the first condition to the other three. As predicted, inducing load during the high salience trigger augmented TDA, t(38) = 3.28, p < .01. 
In addition, a second prediction was that the load at both trigger and aggression/high trigger salience condition would increase TDA relative to the no load conditions, as well as the load at both trigger and aggression/low salience trigger conditions. A planed contrast confirmed this prediction, t(35) = 3.12, p < .01.
	Mediation analyses. It was hypothesized that negative reactions to the trigger mediate the interactive relationship between the independent variables and aggression. The analyses presented above indicated that, when trigger salience was high, aggression levels did not differ reliably in the no-load and load-at-aggression cells (i.e., both relatively low aggression), and that aggression levels in the load-at-trigger and the load-at-trigger-and-aggression cells also did not differ from each other (i.e., both relatively high aggression). Therefore, I collapsed the two “low-aggression” cells and the two “high-aggression” cells, essentially creating a 2 (Salience; high, low) x 2 (Cognitive load; at trigger, not at trigger) design. To test to for mediation, two variables were created (using effects coding in a regression equation) contrasting the cognitive load at trigger/high salience condition with the remaining conditions to represent the predictors. This created one salience IV with two levels; one representing the conditions in which salience was high (coded as +1), and the other level representing conditions in which salience was low (coded -1). The other IV represented the conditions in which cognitive load was induced during the trigger (alone and at aggression). One level represented load at trigger (coded as +1), and the other represented no load at trigger (coded as -1). The interaction term was created by multiplying the terms for each IV and creating a new variable, which was entered in the regression equations used to test for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, the negative reactions to the trigger were significantly associated with the predictor variable (see Figure 3). Second, aggression also was significantly associated with the predictor variable. Third, the mediator was a reliable predictor of aggression. Finally, including negative reactions to the trigger in the analysis resulted in a significant decrease in the path linking the predictor variable with aggression, z = 1.95, p = .053, indicating that the affect variable accounted for significant variance in this relation.
Discussion
It has been hypothesized that a state of limited cognitive processing capacity interacts with the salience of provoking events to moderate retaliatory behavior. Although this hypothesis has been investigated in the context of alcohol and aggression, no published study has examined the effects of such a cognitive state on aggression in other contexts. This study is the first to do so and to examine the hypothesized relationships among cognitive load, provocation salience, negative affect, and aggression. It is also the first to separately examine the effects of provocation salience and of self-regulation of aggression in the context of the TDA paradigm. 
	In the current study, cognitive load and trigger salience interacted to augment triggered displaced aggression, supporting the hypothesis that impaired cognitive processing capacity moderates aggression by impacting the processing of provoking cues. More specifically, the data showed that relative to the no cognitive load conditions, the induction of cognitive load while participants read a negative evaluation produced higher aggression levels, but only when the negative evaluation was highly salient. Similarly, inducing cognitive load at both trigger and aggression augmented the level of aggression under high trigger salience. In contrast, low trigger salience had no impact on aggression regardless of load. These findings parallel those of Denson et al. (2007), in which alcohol augmented triggered displaced aggression when trigger salience was high, suggesting that the same processes are at least partly involved in both cases. 
Another important finding is that cognitive load and trigger salience interact such that participants reacted more negatively to the high salience trigger under cognitive load. The pattern of results matched those of the aggression measure, with more negative reactions being positively correlated with aggression. More importantly, negative reactions to the trigger served to partially mediate the relationship between the independent variables and TDA. This is an important finding because, although researchers hypothesize that impaired cognitive processing capacity increases aggression by reducing the processing of inhibitory cues, these data show that cognitive impairment also augments aggression by producing a more intense affective reaction to salient provoking cues. This is not to say that inhibiting mechanisms do not play a role in the phenomenon in question, but rather, that the relationship between limited cognitive processing capacity and aggression is very complex and that perceptual processes and the resulting affective reactions to provocations play an important role in it. Indeed, reactions to the trigger were only a partial mediator of TDA, suggesting that other processes are at work. It may be, for instance, that the distortional effect of the Time 1 provocation on subsequent negative effects is largely automatic and bypasses more conscious processes that involve attributions and emotions.  This would be consistent with Berkowitz’s model of aggression, which proposes that the initial motivation to aggress is not dependent on attributions or the experience of specific emotions, such as anger (Berkowitz, 1990).  Thus, participants’ recollection of emotions does not have to correspond directly with the aggression they express.
Findings in the low-salience conditions also require discussion. Relative to the no load conditions, cognitive load did not reduce aggression when the trigger was low in salience. In addition, cognitive load had no effect on the reactions to the low-salience trigger. I expected that cognitive load might distract from noticing the subtle trigger and thereby reduce displaced aggression. The results did not confirm this expectation. A second possibility was that cognitive load would not preclude noticing the low-salience provocation, but rather, reduce an individual’s ability to elaborate on it. Such a provocation can still impact aggression to some degree, depending on the intensity of the load induction and the attention that participants are able to devote to reading the provocation. Given that participants were engaging in only 2 tasks—rehearsing the number and reading the provoking feedback--it is likely that they were still able to notice and process the provocation, but the cognitive load induction might have interfered with the elaboration necessary to increase aggression relative to the no-load condition.
	Unexpectedly, cognitive load at aggression had no reliable impact on displaced aggression. Although aggression was higher in the load at both trigger and aggression/high salience condition, this was likely due to the effects of load during a high salience trigger. There are several potential explanations for the lack of this predicted effect. One explanation is that the load induction was too weak and the participants maintained sufficient cognitive resources to engage in self-regulation. However, the cognitive load manipulation employed in this study has been used with success in previous research to impact other cognitive processes, and in the current study it interacted with provocation salience to produce differential effects on aggression and affect.
Another potential explanation may be that because participants in the cognitive load at trigger and at aggression condition rehearsed the 10-digit number twice, practice effects reduced the effectiveness of the load induction during aggression. However, participants who experienced load only at aggression could not have benefited from such practice effects because they only rehearsed the number once (at trigger), but their aggression also was unaffected.
A third possibility is that the motivation to engage in self-regulation was low. Engaging in self-regulation implies a motivation to engage in such behavior. A person likely regulates aggressive behavior based on the perceived consequences of aggressing. In this study, the participants were told that all their responses were anonymous and that no further contact with their partner would occur. They received this information to ensure that they would feel free to retaliate without fear of negative consequences. Such a situation likely reduces the need or motivation to regulate an aggressive response. If participants perceived no need to engage in self-regulation, load at aggression could have only a weak impact on aggression levels through that route. 
What can one conclude about the impact of load at trigger versus load at aggression from this study?  With regards to the TDA paradigm as implemented here, the findings point to the reactions to the trigger as an important route through which aggression increases. Negative affect and TDA increased only when the trigger was salient.  I conceptualize the relationship between load at trigger and load at aggression as two related, but different modifiers of aggressive retaliatory behavior. The former involves primarily the initial push or instigation towards aggression. The latter involves primarily inhibitory factors related to ensuring a proper or justified response once the motivation to aggress has been induced. Metaphorically speaking, the phenomenon at hand resembles moving a truck. Inducing load at trigger, when the trigger is sufficiently high in salience, augments the motivation or push towards an aggressive response. This is like pressing the accelerator deeply in order to get the truck moving at a high speed. Inducing load at aggression, however, theoretically affects the behavioral consequence of or reaction to the instigation in order to avoid potentially negative consequences. This is similar to using the brakes to maintain a safe speed. Effects of load at aggression are likely to manifest only if participants have a motivation to regulate their retaliatory response. Employing the truck metaphor once more, this is similar to using the brakes when the driver perceives the need, as when an obstacle comes into view. If there is no obstacle, or if there is no other reason for adjusting the speed, the brakes are not used. 
	One limitation of this study is that it lacked a direct measure of cognitive impairment, and thus the means to directly test the link between cognitive impairment and affective and behavioral reactions. Neither the salience measure nor the item intended to measure processing of the trigger showed reliable differences between conditions, and thus it was not possible to test whether a decrease in processing capacity influenced negative affect. Without functional manipulation checks, the process through which cognitive load impacts reactions to provocations remains unclear.
	A second limitation is that most of the participants were females. Restricting the analysis to females did not change the direction of the effects. Nevertheless, there were not enough male participants to include gender as a factor. Although a previous meta-analysis has shown that men and women express similar levels when they are provoked (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996), it is possible that males react differently to the effects of the IVs. For instance, men a more aggressive than women at lower levels of provocation (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). It may be that men are more easily primed to respond aggressively, and thus, could displace more aggression than women when trigger salience is low.
	A third limitation involves the order of measurement of aggression and affective reactions. Aggression was measured before participants completed the trigger manipulation checks. It is possible that differences in negative affect were reflecting justification for aggression. That is, participants may have noticed their aggression levels and adjusted the levels of negative affect they reported experiencing as a type of justification. 
The current study has numerous implications for future research. First, it raises the question about the exact process through which high salience augments affective reactions. One potential process might involve a type of perceptual and/or affective disinhibition whereby cognitive load interferes with the processes of self-regulating one’s affective reactions to instigating events, thereby augmenting negative affect when the trigger is salient.
A second process might involve a type of contrast in the perceptual field of an individual. Under normal levels of cognitive resources, individuals are able to process more information and be aware of multiple events. At that moment, their perceptual field is relatively wide, and as a result, a specific event occupies a relatively small area in it. In contrast, when cognitive processing capacity is diminished, a salient event occupies a greater proportion of the perceptual field of individuals. Consequently, this event might appear larger, motivating a stronger reaction. 
Another issue involves the elaboration of provoking cues. As suggested, some situations might impact aggression by moderating the degree to which an individual is able to elaborate on the meaning of a provocation. Thus, a state of impaired cognitive processing capacity might not preclude noticing a provoking cue, but rather, it may reduce the ability to engage in higher order cognitive processes, such as making negative attributions. 
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Mean Negative Reactions to Trigger as a Function of Trigger Salience, Cognitive Load at Trigger, and Cognitive Load at Aggression
__________________________________________________________

                                                          Cognitive Load
                             Trigger Salience	No load	Load at trigger	Load at aggression	At trigger and aggression 
High	4.35 (1.16)	5.27 (.61)	4.98 (1.13)	5.24 (.86)
Low	4.58 (1.06)	4.62 (.98)	4.92 (.63)	4.20 (1.30)







Mean Aggression Levels as a Function of Trigger Salience, Cognitive Load at Trigger, and Cognitive Load at Aggression.
__________________________________________________________

                                                          Cognitive Load
                             Trigger Salience	No load	Load at trigger	Load at aggression	At trigger and aggression 
High	4.22 a(1.09)	6.55 (1.21)	5.00 (1.13)	6.80 (1.48)
Low	4.55 (2.02)	4.36 (2.34)	4.80 (.1.99)	4.11 (2.03)







Figure 1. Mean negative reactions to trigger as a function of trigger salience and cognitive load. Higher scores indicate more negative reactions.
Figure 1. Mean aggression scores as a function of trigger salience and cognitive load. Higher scores indicate higher aggression levels. 
Figure 3. Mediational model demonstrating that affective reactions to the trigger partially mediated the relationship between the cognitive load x trigger salience interaction and physical aggression. All paths are significant, p < .05.





















































Aggression

(.47)*

.27*

.22*

.36*


Negative Reactions
to Trigger

Cognitive Load
x Trigger Salience









PAGE  







